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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has granted leave to hear this matter from the trial Court's ruling 
Denying summary judgment for the Petitioner/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW. 
On what standards will the Court of Apppeals reverse the trial court's 
determination of alimony. May a trial court, upon motion of a party review the stipulation 
entered at the time of divorce to determine compliance with the stipulation. May a party 
rely on a stipulation waiving alimony when he has not strictly complied with the terms of 
that stipulation. Whether the parties characterization of payments as support rather than 
alimony is controlling in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case. Does the 
Utah Code granting ongoing jurisdiction to the courts to make changes after a divorce 
valid law or not. May a court review the ambiguities in the documentation and application 
of a case in considering to enter a corrected order nunc pro tunc. The standard of review 
is abuse of discretion " The will not disturb the trial court's award of alimony unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion has been shown. Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 
210 (Ut. App. 1988). Citing Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App 1987). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5 (7) (a) The court shall consider at least the 
Following factors I determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
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(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court herein issued an order declining to grant Appellant's motion for 
summary dismissal of the Verified Petition to Modify presented by the Respondent. 
Thereafter the Petitioner/Appellant filed his interlocutory appeal. (Ruling appealed from 
attached as addendum 1). 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced on or about March 2000. 
2. At the time of the divorce Petitioner was employed earning over $50,000 per year. 
Respondent who had just become employed part time earned far less. 
3. During the divorce proceedings Respondent was not represented by counsel. 
4. During the course of the parities marriage Respondent was only employed outside 
the home for short intervals. She employed herself in the care of Mr. Medley and their 
children. 
5. This was a 30 year marriage. 
6. Respondent was much less sophisticated than Plaintiff in matters outside the 
sphere of the home. 
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7. As a result of Plaintiff s treatment of Respondent over the years and her principal 
employment as a housewife she was not assertive and ill prepared for the legal 
maneuverings of a divorce proceeding. 
8. Petitioner had worked for a number of years at the Deseret Generation plant 
outside Vernal, Utah. 
9. The decree of divorce is silent as to any health problems on the part of the 
Respondent. None were anticipated at the time. 
10. Petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss and his Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss is silent to the issue of modifying the decree of divorce nunc pro tunc. (Utah 
Code Annotated section 30-4a-L 1953 as amended.) 
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND DISCUSSION 
Petitioner/Appellant relies on the case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 
(Utah App. 1988). The Petitioner also rightly notes that the stipulation was not upheld in 
that case. A fact which distinguishes this case from Kinsman case is that the parties in 
Kinsman were only married three (3) years. Under Utah law alimony is specifically to be 
considered in marriages of long duration. (Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5). It would appear 
that Petitioner clearly had this factor in mind when he termed the payments to 
Respondent as something other than alimony. However, alimony would certainly be 
considered in any marriage of 30 years, especially given the enormous difference in 
income between the Plaintiff and the Respondent. Respondent would note her poorer 
bargaining position and lack of representation. The Court in Kinsman makes a couple of 
interesting statements. One reads thus; "When the facts of this case are examined, 
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however, two alternate theories for relief are presented. Neither of these theories was 
presented to the trial court." Kinsman v. Kinsman, 745 P2d 210(Ut.Ct. App. 1988). The 
case refers to footnote two which is not very illuminating on what the alternate two 
theories may be. However, footnote 3 is very enlightening and beneficial to the 
Respondent/Appellee it reads: 
To determine whether a debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support 
and therefore non-dischargeable, the court first looks to the divorce decree creating the 
debt. From the decree and the circumstances resulting in the decree the court can 
determine the nature of the debt. The court then looks at the circumstances of the 
petitioner at the time of the petition and may then determine that those circumstances still 
require a finding of non-dischargeability . The test to be applied at both stages is "if 
without the debt assumption, the spouse would be inadequately supported, the debt 
assumption was meant to be support." Holt v. Holt, 672 P2d 738, 741 (Utah 1983) quoted 
in Beckman, 685 P.2d at 1050. As it further pointed out, "To enforce the general purpose 
of the bankruptcy laws in providing relief for the debtor, the test announced in Holt v. 
Holt, supra, must be passed at the time the debt was imposed in the divorce decree and 
again at the time the discharge of the debt is attempted." Id. This test could easily have 
been applied to the decree and the facts in this case. If the debts were found to be non-
dischargeable, defendant would remain obligated for payment. The decreed would be left 
undisturbed and either the creditors or the plaintiff could enforce defendant's obligation 
to pay. 
In Kinsman, there was a stipulation which provided that the defendant was 
ordered to pay certain debts of the marriage. He declared bankruptcy and was discharged 
from those debts. The Kinsman court held him liable for those debts by reforming the 
stipulation to conclude that the payment of the debts was in fact alimony. 
Respondent asks this court to follow the result in Kinsman. In Kinsman despite 
the fact that the parties stipulated to call alimony something other than alimony, the court 
applying reasoning like that evidenced in footnote three, determined that despite the 
language of the stipulation, the moneys to be paid were in fact alimony. Note that they 
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said that the circumstances at the time and the circumstances of the stipulation needs be 
looked at with an eye to see if ".. .without the debt assumption the spouse would be 
inadequately supported, the debt assumption was meant to be support." Id. In this case 
when the Court looks at the matter it is clear that due to the disparity between the income 
and means of the parties without the payments from the Petitioner to the Respondent. 
The Respondent would be inadequately supported. Therefore, in this case the payments 
to Mrs. Medley were clearly meant to be support. Certainly, Petitioner had in mind the 
requirements of UCA 30-3-5. 
The Kinsman court ruled that under Utah law a divorce court retains its equitable 
powers. 'Under Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in equity so far as child custody, 
support payments, and the like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing jurisdiction 
over the parties, and power to make equitable redistribution or other modification of the 
original decree as equity might dictate. In both the formulation of the original decree and 
any modifications thereof, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers.. . ." 
Id. The Kinsman, case relied on by the Appelant further supports the positions of the 
Appellee. Referring to the doctrine of Res Judicata, which Appellant is trying to invoke 
without so claiming, even Kinsman, cites McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 
1978) The Court quoted the "continuing jurisdiction" language of section 30-3-5 and 
clarified the res judicata effect of a divorce decree as follows: "Even though the decree is 
res judicata as to circumstances existing at the time of the decree, if there are changed 
circumstances so requiring, there can be a further adjudication thereon." 
The Appellant has proposed a very narrow reading of Kinsman. 
The Kinsman, court did not presume to overrule the Utah Supreme Court ruling in 
Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 1981), wherein it was ruled "' ...that in an 
appropriate case where there had been a significant change of circumstances, alimony 
could be awarded to a party although the alimony awarded in the Decree had terminated 
or no alimony was awarded." Kinsman. 
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II. 
The case of Meyers v. Meyers, 768 P.2d 979, 101 Utah Adv. Rep 57 (Ut. Ct. 
App.1989), comes close to overruling the language of Kinsman that the Petitioner relies 
on. In the Meyers case the parties had stipulated after evaluations to the respondent 
having custody of the children so long as she did not leave the state of Utah. The 
stipulation further provided that if she did leave the state, that custody should be awarded 
to the petitioner. The Meyers court ruled that stipulations could not take away the court's 
continuing jurisdiction over equitable issues. They characterize Kinsman as dealing with 
property issues and not dealing with support or custody issues. 
Despain and Kinsman apply a contract theory to property distribution issues. See 
Kinsman, 748 P.2d at 121-13. Such a theory is inapplicable to issues which involve the 
continuing, equitable powers of the court, as here. In Despain, the Utah Supreme Court 
state that defendant has failed to observe the distinction between those cases involving 
the statutory power of a court in a divorce proceeding to enter orders concerning support 
and those cases in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their property rights 
by agreement, the terms of which are incorporated in a decree. Id. At 527. The court 
concluded that child support, even if originally set by stipulation, is always open to the 
court's power of modification upon a proper showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances. Similarly, in Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this 
court modified a divorce decree in spite of a contrary stipulation of the parties. We stated, 
"the parties' stipulation was accepted by the court and incorporated into the decree. The 
terms of the stipulation thereby fall under the continuing jurisdiction of the court in 
divorce actions." Id. At 838. In the present case, the stipulation incorporated into the 
divorce decree, as in Despain and Balls, deals with an issue normally open to 
modification under the court's equitable powers, child custody. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-
5(3) (1985). Therefore, it comes under the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be 
modified. The trial court is not bound by the parties' stipulation, and may rule otherwise 
if the circumstances warrant. Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979,101 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 
(Utah Ct App. 1989). 
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The issue of alimony is clearly among those which involve the ongoing 
jurisdiction of the court. Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5 1953 as amended. The 
issue of alimony also clearly involves the court's powers of equity, the first part of the 
code section dealing with support, custody, alimony and property reads: "When a decree 
of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders...." Thus despite the 
stipulation of the parties to try to limit this Court's ongoing jurisdiction, caselaw has 
ruled that the jurisdiction cannot be limited by stipulation or even by a signed decree of 
divorce incorporating the stipulation. 
The courts clearly seem to be ruling that they have continuing jurisdiction to make 
equitable adjustments and changes in divorces, despite any effort by one or more of the 
parties to bind them otherwise. In fact the court in the Myers case specifically cites Balls 
v. Hackev as standing for the rule that by incorporating a stipulation into a decree of 
divorce the terms of the stipulation itself come under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court, thus making it subject to interpretation and modification on the appropriate 
showings under the law. The case of Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 235 Adv. Rep. 43 
(Utah App. 1994), was a case in which the parties stipulated to alimony in the amount of 
$1 per year. That Court did affirm the trial court's decision to not change the award of 
permanent alimony since the circumstances were deemed not to have changed 
significantly, however the Court did reaffirm that under Utah Code Annotated 30-3-3 the 
trial court had "continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the part ies, . . ." etcetera. Id Wells. 
In the Mitchell case the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff had been "awarded 
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the family home in lieu of substantial alimony payments,..." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527, 
528 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). The Supreme Court allowed the modification of the $1 per 
year of alimony, despite that award. 
THE LAW ACCORDING TO KINSMAN 
The Kinsman case has only been cited 6 times in its history. Twice in divorce 
cases in Utah. The first one is an unreported case from the year 2000, wherein the 
Petitioner sought to overturn a stipulated property settlement. She was challenging the 
valuations of the properties. The stipulation itself noted that the valuations were in 
dispute. The other case was Meyers v. Meyers cited above, which notes that courts are 
not bound by parties stipulations in a divorce. Once in a civil case in Utah. Henderson v. 
For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988). The case dealt with cement forms. The 
issue cited was one dealing with cross appeals. Once in the dissent in a divorce in 
Vermont. And in two bar journals. In short the Appellee was unable to find any instance 
in Utah or elsewhere where Kinsman has been favorably cited for the reading propounded 
by the Appellant herein. 
APPELANT'S CASE LAW FROM FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
The case of Cannon v. Cannon, 514 S.E. 2d 204 (Ga 1999) involved a case where 
a modification of alimony was sought. In the parties settlement agreement they had 
waived the right to revise the judgment for permanent alimony. The party against whom 
the change of alimony was sought died during the pendency of the modification action. 
The trial court in that case found that the settlement agreement did not "create a waiver 
of either party's right to seek a modification of alimony...." After a review of the 
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specific language of the agreement the appellate court found that the parties had waived a 
revision of permanent alimony in that case. The case did not find that the Trial Court 
could not consider the matter. In the case at bar the Appellant seeks to disallow the Trial 
Court to even consider the matter. Malov v. Maloy, 362 So. 2d 484 (Fla. App., 1978) was 
a case involving an antenuptial agreement, not a settlement agreement after divorce. In 
fact the current applicable Florida statute does provide that the court can modify a 
agreement between parties as to support, maintenance or alimony. (Florida statute 
attached Florida Statute section 61.14}. Voight v. Voiaht. 670 N.E. 2d 1271(Ind. 1996) 
was a case in which the appellate court ruled that the trial courts did have the authority to 
modify settlement agreements. However, they ruled that where Indiana law did not permit 
the trial court to enter the type of order sought to modified in the first place, then the trial 
court could not modify the agreement to create the relief that it could not fashion under 
Indianna law in the first instance. 
The Court said "Where a court had no authority to impose the kind of maintenance 
award that the parties forged in a settlement agreement, the court cannot subsequently 
modify the maintenance obligation originally derived from their mutual assent. In 
approving or rejecting any submitted modification agreement, a court should apply the 
same standard it would use in evaluating an initial settlement agreement:" Id 
Another interesting feature to that case was the fact that the trial court found at the time 
the agreement was entered that the "settlement agreement was entered into fairly, 
without fraud, duress or undue influence*'. 
Nichols v. Nichols, 469 N.W. 2d 619 (Wis. 1991) this case cited by the Appellant 
upheld a non modification clause in a settlement agreement where both parties were 
represented by counsel when it was entered. 
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The Staple v. Staple, 616 N.W. 2d 219 (Mich App. 2000), case relied on by the Appellant 
is a case that uses the terms "periodic alimony" and "alimony in gross", the court defines 
alimony in gross as not really alimony but a division of property. In that case the court 
determined that the parties could waive the ability to modify "alimony in gross". 
Even under the terms of the Kinsman case itself the Court retains jurisdiction to 
review both the effect of the terms of the agreement (terming payments on debts as 
alimony) and to require strict compliance with any agreements incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce. 
Clearly, in all the jurisdictions cited the Trial Court retains the authority to 
interpret and give meaning even to the terms the parties utilize in any agreements between 
themselves. In the case at bar the Appellant seeks to bind the court to his interpretation of 
language and effect in a settlement agreement where only one party was represented. The 
Trial Court should be free under the law to interpret the language and effect of periodic 
monthly payments. The Trial Court does not lose its jurisdiction to determine compliance 
with any agreement between the parties incorporated into a divorce decree. To conclude 
otherwise would be to divest of Court's their ongoing jurisdiction in any case to adjudge 
compliance with the orders of the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant seeks a ruling from this Court reversing the Trial Court's 
determination of alimony and dismissing Appellee's action in District Court on the 
grounds that the Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the parties, which is contrary to 
statute, case law and public policy. 
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Respectfully submitted this / 7 day of May, 2003. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Cleve J. Hatch attorney for Freda Medley Respondent/ Appellee certifies that he ;ertities tn 
served the Brief of Appellee upon counsel by placing two true and correct copies theron 
in an envelope addressed to, Clark Allred, 121 West Main Street. Vernal, Utah 84078, 
postage prepaid this//? day of May, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. The ruling appealed from which denies Appellant's Motion to Dismiss dated 
October 3, 2003. 
2. Affidavit of Freda Medley dated 1 October, 2002. 
3. Florida Statute section 61.14 
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OCT 0 9 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
•JINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
OCT 0 ? 2002 
.IOANIMEJMCME.E, CLERK 
BY LdL DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES C. MEDLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FREDA A. MEDLEY, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 994800321 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
The Court having received petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, respondent's Memorandum in 
Support of Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss, and petitioner's Reply Memorandum, 
having reviewed the pleadings and being otherwise fully informed, enters the following: 
Because the Court under appropriate circumstances may enter new orders of alimony, it is 
hereby ORDERED petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
Dated this % day of October, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. Lynn Pa\afe, District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
copy of the attached document was sent to the 
for case 994800321 by the method and on the date 
METHOD NAME 
Mail CLEVE HATCH 
ATTORNEY RES 
171 E. 100 S. 
P.O. Box 1053 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
By Hand CLARK B ALLRED 
day of CoWk% - 20 pL • 
Deputy Court Clerk 
i-i_„„ •% n _ „4- •* 
Cleve J Hatch (5609) 
Attorney for Respondent 
P.O. Box 1053 
171 East 100 South 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
435-725-5550 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES C. MEDLEY, | 
Petitioner, i 
Vs. i 
FREDA A. MEDLEY, 1 
Respondent. 1 
[ AFFIDAVIT OF 
[ FREDA A. MEDLEY 
[ Case number 994800321 
' Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Comes now Freda A, Medley, being first sworn and duly under oath asserts and 
affirms as follows: 
1. That at the divorce decree and the stipulation between myself and the 
Petitioner provided that Petitioner would pay certain bills and responsibilities. 
2. Petitioner was required to pay the insurance premium and the property tax 
on the 1996 Mercury automobile as agreed and ordered. 
3. Petitioner did not pay the insurance nor the property tax on the automobile. 
I paid those. 
3. Petitioner also did not ever send to me the proceeds of one half of a second 
retirement account that he had. 
4. I am now unemployed. I frequent Job Service and SOS Temporaries, 
places through which I have been able to obtain temporary employment before, as of yet I 
have been unable to find new employment. 
Further this affiant sayeth not. 
Dated this J_ day of October, 2002. 
State of Utah ) 
)ss 
County of Uintah ) 
Freda A. Medley, being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and says that the 
foregoing affidavit is true and correct of her own knowledge, information and belief, 
except for those statements made under information and belief, those she believes to be 
true and correct. 
Freda A. Medley 
Subscribed to and sworn to before me this J_ day of October, 2002 
?rvi% 
NOTARY: 
fiS3to"*T 
oTUWi 
I ^/VX^OX^V \ ^ A L*J 
.J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Freda A Medley, postage prepaid to Clark B. Allred, McKeachnie, Allred, McCIellan, and 
Trotter, 121 West Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078 this J day of October, 2002. 
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(l)(a) When the parties enter into an agreement for payments for, or instead of, support, maintenance, or alimony, whether in connection with a proceeding for 
dissolution or separate maintenance or with any voluntary property settlement, or when a party is required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances 
or the financial ability of either party changes or the child who is a beneficiary of an agreement or court order as described herein reaches majority after the execution 
of the agreement or the rendition of the order, either party may apply to the circuit court of the circuit in which the parties, or either of them, resided at the date of the 
execution of the agreement or reside at the date of the application, or in which the agreement was executed or in which the order was rendered, for an order decreasing 
or increasing the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, with due regard to the changed 
circumstances or the financial ability of the parties or the child, decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony 
provided for in the agreement or order. A finding that medical insurance is reasonably available or the child support guidelines in s. 61.30 may constitute changed 
circumstances. Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.30(1 l)(c), the court may modify an order of support, maintenance, or alimony by increasing or decreasing the 
support, maintenance, or alimony retroactively to the date of the filing of the action or supplemental action for modification as equity requires, giving due regard to the 
changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties or the child. 
(b) For each support order reviewed by the department as required by s. 409.2564(12), if the amount of the child support award under the order differs by at least 10 
percent but not less than $25 from the amount that would be awarded under s. 61.30, the department shall seek to have the order modified and any modification shall 
be made without a requirement for proof or showing of a change in circumstances. 
(c) The department shall have authority to adopt rules to implement this section. 
(2) When an order or agreement is modified pursuant to subsection (1), the party having an obligation to pay shall pay only the amount of support, maintenance, or 
alimony directed in the new order, and the agreement or earlier order is modified accordingly. No person may commence an action for modification of a support, 
maintenance, or alimony agreement or order except as herein provided. No court has jurisdiction to entertain any action to enforce the recovery of separate support, 
maintenance, or alimony other than as herein provided. 
(3) This section is declaratory of existing public policy and of the laws of this state. 
(4) If a party applies for a reduction of alimony or child support and the circumstances justify the reduction, the court may make the reduction of alimony or child 
support regardless of whether or not the party applying for it has fully paid the accrued obligations to the other party at the time of the application or at the time of the 
order of modification. 
(5)(a) When a court of competent jurisdiction enters an order for the payment of alimony or child support or both, the court shall make a finding of the obligor's 
imputed or actual present ability to comply with the order. If the obligor subsequently fails to pay alimony or support and a contempt hearing is held, the original order 
of the court creates a presumption that the obligor has the present ability to pay the alimony or support and to purge himself or herself from the contempt. At the 
contempt hearing, the obligor shall have the burden of proof to show that he or she lacks the ability to purge himself or herself from the contempt. This presumption is 
adopted as a presumption under s. 90.302(2) to implement the public policy of this state that children shall be maintained from the resources of their parents and as 
provided for in s. 409.2551, and that spouses be maintained as provided for in s. 61.08. The court shall state in its order the reasons for granting or denying the 
contempt. 
(b) In a judicial circuit with a work experience and job training pilot project, if at the time of the contempt hearing the obligor is unemployed or has no income, then 
the court shall order the obligor to seek employment, if the obligor is able to engage in employment, and to immediately notify the court upon obtaining employment, 
upon obtaining any income, or upon obtaining any ownership of any asset with a value of $500 or more. If the obligor is still unemployed 30 days after any order for 
support, the court may order the obligor to enroll in a work experience, job placement, and job training program for noncustodial parents as established in s. 409.2565, 
if the obligor is eligible for entrance into the pilot program. 
(6)(a) 1. When support payments are made through the local depository or through the State Disbursement Unit, any payment or installment of support which becomes 
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due and is unpaid under any support order is delinquent; and this unpaid payment or installment, and all other costs and fees herein provided for, become, after notice 
to the obligor and the time for response as set forth in this subsection, a final judgment by operation of law, which has the full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment 
entered by a court in this state for which execution may issue. No deduction shall be made by the local depository from any payment made for costs and fees accrued in 
the judgment by operation of law process under paragraph (b) until the total amount of support payments due the obligee under the judgment has been paid. 
2. A certified statement by the local depository evidencing a delinquency in support payments constitute evidence of the final judgment under this paragraph. 
3. The judgment under this paragraph is a final judgment as to any unpaid payment or installment of support which has accrued up to the time either party files a 
motion with the court to alter or modify the support order, and such judgment may not be modified by the court. The court may modify such judgment as to any unpaid 
payment or installment of support which accrues after the dare of the filing of the motion to alter or modify the support order. This subparagraph does not prohibit the 
court from providing relief from the judgment pursuant to Kule 1.540, l-lorida Rules of Civil Procedure . 
(b) 1. When an obligor is 15 days delinquent in making a payment or installment of support and the amount of the delinquency is greater than the periodic payment 
amount ordered by the court, the local depository shall serve notice on the obligor informing him or her of: 
a. The delinquency and its amount. 
b. An impending judgment by operation of law against him or her in the amount of the delinquency and all other amounts which thereafter become due and are unpaid, 
together with costs and a fee of $5, for failure to pay the amount of the delinquency. 
c. The obligor's right to contest the impending judgment and the ground upon which such contest can be made. 
d. The local depository's authority to release information regarding the delinquency to one or more credit reporting agencies. 
2. The local depository shall serve the notice by mailing it by first class mail to the obligor at his or her last address of record with the local depository. If the obligor 
has no address of record with the local depository, service shall be by publication as provided in chapter 49. 
3. When service of the notice is made by mail, service is complete on the date of mailing. 
(c) Within 15 days after service of the notice is complete, the obligor may file with the court that issued the support order, or with the court in the circuit where the 
local depository which served the notice is located, a motion to contest the impending judgment. An obligor may contest the impending judgment only on the ground of 
a mistake of fact regarding an error in whether a delinquency exists, in the amount of the delinquency, or in the identity of the obligor. 
(d) The court shall hear the obligor's motion to contest the impending judgment within 15 days after the date of the filing of the motion. Upon the court's denial of the 
obligor's motion, the amount of the delinquency and all other amounts which thereafter become due, together with costs and a fee of $5, become a final judgment by 
operation of law against the obligor. The depository shall charge interest at the rate established in s. 55.03 on all judgments for support. 
(e) If the obligor fails to file a motion to contest the impending judgment within the time limit prescribed in paragraph (c) and fails to pay the amount of the 
delinquency and all other amounts which thereafter become due, together with costs and a fee of $5, such amounts become a final judgment by operation of law against 
the obligor at the expiration of the time for filing a motion to contest the impending judgment. 
(f)l. Upon request of any person, the local depository shall issue, upon payment of a fee of $5, a payoff statement of the total amount due under the judgment at the 
time of the request. The statement may be relied upon by the person for up to 30 days from the time it is issued unless proof of satisfaction of the judgment is provided. 
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2. When the depository records show that the obligor's account is current, the depository shall record a satisfaction of the judgment upon request of any interested 
person and upon receipt of the appropriate recording fee. Any person shall be entitled to rely upon the recording of the satisfaction. 
3. The local depository, at the direction of the department, or the obligee in a non-IV-D case, may partially release the judgment as to specific real property, and the 
depository shail record a partial release upon receipt of the appropriate recording fee. 
4. The local depository is not liable for errors in its recordkeeping, except when an error is a result of unlawful activity or gross negligence by the clerk or his or her 
employees. 
(7) When modification of an existing order of support is sought, the proof required to modify a settlement agreement and the proof required to modify an award 
established by court order shall be the same. 
(8)(a) [I'"Nl| When reviewing and approving any lump-sum settlement under s. 440.20(1 l)(a) and (b), a judge of compensation claims must consider whether the 
settlement serves the interests of the worker and the worker's family, including, but not limited to, whether the settlement provides for appropriate recovery of any child 
support arrearage. 
(b) In accordance with the provisions of s. 440.22, any compensation due or that may become due an employee under chapter 440 is exempt from garnishment, 
attachment, execution, and assignment of income, except for the purposes of enforcing child or spousal support obligations. 
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